光华讲坛

主题：Self-interest of independent directors and liquidations of mutual funds

（独立董事私利与共同基金清算）

主讲人：中山大学国际金融学院 张悦

主持人：威尼斯wns888app下载|中国有限公司 华晨

时间：2023年5月30日上午10：30-12：00

举办地点：柳林校区诚正楼841会议室

主办单位：威尼斯wns888app下载 科研处

主讲人简介：张悦，中山大学国际金融学院助理教授，巴斯大学管理学院金融学博士，公司金融方向硕士生导师。主要研究方向为共同基金、公司治理。以通讯作者身份撰写多篇高水平工作论文，并发表于《Journal of Corporate Finance》、《International Review of Financial Analysis》等期刊。

论文摘要：Using a large, hand-collected dataset of over 10,000 U.S. mutual funds, we study the impact that independent directors’ alignment with fund families, as opposed to their alignment with shareholders, has on the degree to which fund performance and fund flows affect the probability of fund liquidations. We find consistent evidence that alignment of directors with fund families increases the weight put on fund flows and reduces the weight put on fund performance in liquidation decisions in retail funds. We do not find such an effect in institutional funds. Greater director–shareholders alignment increases the weight put on fund performance and reduces the weight put on fund flows in liquidation decisions in institutional funds but not in retail funds. Our results indicate that when shareholders’ monitoring is weak it is important to restrict directors’ business links with fund families, and that directors’ share ownership in funds they oversee is an ineffective tool when it comes to protecting shareholders’ rights.

基于手工收集的超过10,000只美国共同基金的数据集，我们研究了独立董事与基金家族之间的利益一致性以及独立董事与股东（投资者）之间的利益一致性如何影响基金业绩和净现金流在基金清算决策中的作用。研究发现，董事与基金家族的利益一致性增加了净现金流在清算决策中的权重，而降低了基金业绩的权重，同时，这一结论只在散户基金中成立。在机构基金的清算决策中，董事与股东之间的利益一致性增加了基金业绩在清算决策中的作用，降低了净现金流的作用，同时，这一结论只在机构基金中成立。我们的研究结果表明，在股东监督薄弱的情况下，限制董事与基金家族的业务联系是很重要的，董事在其监管的基金中所拥有的股份在保护股东权利方面是一个无效的工具。