光华讲坛

主题：CEO Social Media Presence and Insider Trading（高管媒体表现与内幕交易）

主讲人：美国克拉克大学（Clark University）商学院，唐镇洋 副教授

主持人：威尼斯wns888app下载|中国有限公司 邓博夫

时间：2023年4月6日（周四）上午10:30—11:30

举办地点：柳林校区诚正楼841会议室

主办单位：威尼斯wns888app下载 科研处

主讲人简介：

Dr. Zhenyang Tang is an Associate Professor of Finance at Clark University. His research interests include insider trading, corporate social responsibility, corporate governance, and venture capital. His works have appeared in academic journals such as Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Portfolio Management, and Financial Review. Dr. Tang teaches Corporate Finance and Financial Management; he received the School of Management’s Best Undergraduate Professor Award in 2016 and 2019. Dr. Tang earned a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of Alberta, and an MA in Quantitative Economics and a BA in Economics from Tsinghua University.

唐镇洋，克拉克大学商学院金融学副教授。他的研究方向主要包括内幕交易，企业的社会责任，公司治理，风险投资等；曾于Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Portfolio Management, Financial Review等期刊发表多篇论文，并于2016和2019年获得克拉克大学商学院最佳本科教授奖项。他于2014年获得了阿尔伯塔大学金融学博士学位，之前于2007和2009年获得清华大学经济学学士和硕士学位。

内容简介：

In this talk, I will present my recent work on the relationship between CEOs’ social media presence and their insider trading patterns. Consistent with the laboratory findings that online social media usage lowers self-control and encourages indulgent behavior, we find that corporate CEOs show similar tendencies in real life. CEOs with a social media presence are more likely to abuse their information advantage to profit from unethical insider trades. In particular, CEOs’ social media presence strongly predicts their insider trading activity in terms of incidence, intensity, profitability, and opportunism. The effects are largely driven by insider buys (rather than sells) that tend to be more opportunistic and contain more material non-public information. The effects are also more pronounced for CEOs who are active on social media relative to inactive CEOs and for CEOs who are opportunistic traders relative to routine traders.

本次讲座中，我将介绍我关于CEO社交媒体活动和内幕交易之间联系的研究。文献指出社交媒体活跃程度可能与较低的自我约束有联系；我们在CEO身上发现了类似的现象，即拥有个人社交媒体的CEO更可能滥用他们的信息优势并从内幕交易中获利：比起其他CEO，他们更可能进行（非常规）内幕交易，交易量更大，交易获利更多。我们的结果主要存在于CEO购买行为；另外，我们的结果对于在社交媒体上活跃的CEO以及更喜欢从事非常规交易的CEO更加显著。